Tax and the Family: The Gendered Impact of Rules that Take Spousal Status into Account for Tax Purposes by Young, Claire F.L.
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications (Emeriti)
2009
Tax and the Family: The Gendered Impact of Rules
that Take Spousal Status into Account for Tax
Purposes
Claire F.L. Young
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, young@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/emeritus_pubs
Part of the Family Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications
(Emeriti) by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details
Claire F L Young, “Tax and the Family: The Gendered Impact of Rules that Take Spousal Status into Account for Tax Purposes” in
Harry N Scheiber & Laurent Mayal, eds, Japanese Family Law in Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: Robbins Collection, 2009)
317-332.
317
Tax and the Family: 
The Gendered Impact of Rules that Take 
Spousal Status into Account for Tax Purposes
Claire F. L. Young
The last 30 years in Canada have seen dramatic changes in the legal definition of 
“family” and “spouse” as well as our social understanding of these relationships. To-
day in Canada we recognize common law relationships through ascription for many 
legal purposes. Based on a period of cohabitation many, but not all, of the rights and 
duties of marriage have been extended to common law cohabitants. Furthermore, 
common law relationships include both heterosexual and same-sex relationships. 
Most recently, in July 2005 the federal government legalized civil same sex marriage 
across Canada. Both opposite-sex and same-sex partners can now choose whether 
to marry or not; even if they do not, they may still be ascribed spousal status for 
various purposes, based on a period of cohabitation. In other countries such as the 
US and the UK we are seeing a move towards taking the rules that apply to mar-
ried couples and extending them to common law cohabitants or allowing couples 
to register their partnerships so that they can avail themselves of the rights and 
responsibilities accorded to that status.
These changes, and in particular, the recognition of same-sex relationships 
for tax purposes have led me to re-examine how we treat spousal and common law 
relationships in tax law and policy. It is important, however, to emphasise that I 
am not critiquing the inclusion of lesbians and gay men as common law partners. 
That change was an important part of the struggle for equality and indeed was a 
milestone in that quest. But, as I have discussed in other work, I argue that we need 
to rethink the broader issue of why we take marital or familial relationships into 
1. “Common law” is the term used in Canada to describe two people living in a conjugal rela-
tionship that is recognized in law for some purposes.
2. Throughout this paper I refer to “spousal and common law relationships.” Section 248 of 
the Canadian Income Tax Act defines “spouse” as a married person and “common law partner” as an 
individual living in a conjugal relationship with the taxpayer for at least one year.
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account at all for tax purposes. There are two points that should be made at this 
juncture. First, neo-conservative governments are increasingly using tax policies as 
they apply to married persons and common law spouses to reinforce the traditional 
family with a stay-at-home mother and the father as the breadwinner. Secondly, 
governments are increasingly using tax measures that take spousal status into ac-
count to shift economic responsibility for the welfare of citizens from the state to 
the private family. 
My analysis is in three parts. First I trace some of the recent developments 
that led to the inclusion of same-sex couples as common law partners for tax pur-
poses in Canada. I then turn to the political picture and consider the government’s 
keen interest in taking familial or spousal relationships into account for tax pur-
poses. Finally, I turn to some of the particular tax rules that take spousal status into 
account. In a nutshell my question is: can they continue to be justified or should 
we be looking to eliminate all reference to spousal and common law relationships 
from our tax legislation? My conclusion is that many of these provisions should be 
removed from the Income Tax Act (hereinafter the ITA). The reason that they are 
no longer valid varies from rule to rule. For example, some rules have a gendered 
impact, one that frequently discriminates without good reason against women and 
in favour of men. Others, including those that focus on dependency, are inherently 
flawed and poorly targeted so that they do not achieve their policy goals. Some rules 
can be critiqued on the basis that they are simply part of a neo-liberal privatization 
agenda that encourages individuals to rely on the private family for their economic 
security. These rules exclude those people not in spousal or common law relation-
ships from a variety of very important benefits delivered by the tax system. 
Changing Definitions of Spouse in Canada
In order to place the tax rules in the broader social context of changing definitions 
of family and spouse, it is important to trace some of these recent changes. Obvi-
ously marriage has been the primary relationship taken into account by law for a 
variety of purposes over the years. But since the 1970s Canada has increasingly rec-
ognized common law heterosexual relationships through ascription. As mentioned, 
the result is that many of the rights and responsibilities accorded to married couples 
are now accorded to common law couples. It is important to note that Canada is 
unusual in this regard. Very few other countries, including the US and the UK, 
give so many rights and place so many responsibilities on those in common law 
3. Claire Young, “Taxing Times for Lesbians and Gay Men: Equality at What Cost?” Dal-
housie Law Journal 17 (1994), 534–559.
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relationships. In Canada those rights and responsibilities are based on an ascription 
of status as the parties to the relationship do not take that extra step of choosing to 
marry and therefore automatically have their relationships recognized by the state.
During the mid 1990s the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and, in particular 
the equality provision section 15(1), was used with great success to challenge hetero-
sexist definitions of spouse. The result is that since the mid 1990s, same-sex couples 
have increasingly, though unevenly across the provinces, been treated as common 
law couples. On the tax front, the Ontario Court of Appeal had held in 1998 in 
Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General) that the words “or same-sex” should be 
read into the definition of “spouse” in the ITA, for the purposes of registration of 
pension plans. The case was brought by two women who worked for one of Cana-
da’s large unions, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE). CUPE had a 
standard employment pension plan which included a provision for survivor benefits. 
Pension plans in Canada are heavily subsidized by the tax system. They allow for 
deductions for contributions by employers and employees and shelter from tax of 
all income earned by the plan until the pension is received. In order to qualify for 
these subsidies the plan must accord with the requirements of the ITA and before 
Rosenberg that included a definition of spouse that was restricted to heterosexual 
couples. CUPE decided to extend its plan to its lesbian and gay employees on the 
same terms as it applied to its heterosexual employees, but the government refused 
to accept this amendment. By reading the words “or same-sex” into the definition of 
spouse in the ITA for the purpose of pension plans, the court effectively extended 
entitlement to survivor benefits under occupational pension plans to the partners of 
lesbians and gay men who die while covered by the plan. Interestingly, unlike other 
cases involving successful Charter challenges on the basis of sexual orientation, the 
federal government did not appeal this decision.
In 2000 the federal government enacted the Modernization of Benefits and Ob-
ligations Act which amended 68 pieces of legislation to include same-sex couples in 
an array of laws that assign rights and responsibilities based on spousal status. Sec-
tions 130–146 of the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act amended the ITA 
to redefine spouse to include married persons and to add a new definition of com-
4. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11 (hereinafter referred to as the Charter).
5. Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney General), (1998) 38 OR (3d) 577.
6. For an in depth analysis of this case, see Claire Young, “Spousal Status, Pension Benefits 
and Tax: Rosenberg v. Canada (Attorney-General),” Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 6 
(1998), 435–453.
7. Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, SC, C-23, ch. 12 (2000).
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mon law partner which includes a person cohabiting in a conjugal relationship with 
the taxpayer for a period of at least one year. Meanwhile, the Law Commission 
of Canada (LCC) launched a major research project titled “Beyond Conjugality: 
Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships” which entailed a 
“fundamental rethinking of the way in which governments regulate relationships.” 
In brief, the LCC concluded that governments rely too heavily on marital and com-
mon law relationships in accomplishing state objectives. The LCC suggested that 
the government re-evaluate the way in which it regulates relationships, and included 
in the legislation reviewed in this research paper was the ITA. Finally in 2005, Bill 
C-38, the Civil Marriage Act, received Royal Assent and was proclaimed into law, 
legalizing civil same sex marriage across Canada. 
Progress at What Cost?
Without diminishing the struggle that lesbians and gay men have endured to secure 
legal recognition of their relationships, or its potential to challenge heterosexual 
norms and definitions of family, I argue that the recent tax changes in Canada to 
include same-sex couples as common law partners have done nothing to challenge 
the socio-economic and gender inequalities embedded in the tax rules that apply 
to spouses and common law partners. Expanding the definition of those who are 
treated as spouses for tax purposes has simply reinforced those inequalities. It is 
time to revisit and rethink why we take spousal and common law relationships into 
account for tax purposes. Other than the recent work of the Law Commission of 
Canada0 which was part of a larger project examining the numerous laws that take 
spousal status into account, no attention has been paid by legislators over the last 
four decades to the fundamental tax policy question of why we take spousal and 
8. Section 248 provides that a “common law partner” with respect to a taxpayer at any time, 
means a person who cohabits at that time in a conjugal relationship with the taxpayer and: “(a) has 
so cohabited with the taxpayer for a continuous period of at least one year, or (b) would be the parent 
of a child of whom the taxpayer is a parent, if this Act were read without reference to paragraphs 
252(1)(c) and (e) and subparagraph 252(2)(a)(iii), and for the purposes of this definition, where at any 
time the taxpayer and the person cohabit in a conjugal relationship, they are, at any particular time 
after that time, deemed to be cohabiting in a conjugal relationship unless they were not cohabiting 
at the particular time for a period of at least 90 days that includes the particular time because of a 
breakdown of their conjugal relationship”.
9. Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Per-
sonal and Adult Relationships (Ottawa, 2001), ix.
10. Ibid.
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common law relationships into account for certain tax purposes and whether such 
a policy can be justified.
While many see the federal government’s decision to enact the Modernization 
of Benefits and Obligations Act and thus expand the group accorded common law 
status for tax purposes as progressive, we need to be cautious. There is an assump-
tion by many that it is to their advantage to be treated as spouses and common 
law partners for tax purposes. There is a sense that there are more tax breaks for 
couples and that the tax bill of a couple will be lower than it would be if they were 
taxed as individuals. As I have demonstrated in previous work, this is not necessar-
ily true. In fact, the impact of being treated as spouses or common law partners 
varies depending on three factors: the amount of income of each of the partners, 
the nature of that income, and the relative distribution of that income as between 
the partners. As I shall discuss in more detail later, generally speaking, in Canada 
the couple in which there are two low rate taxpayers pays more tax when they are 
treated as a couple rather than as individuals. The couple in which there are two 
high rate taxpayers and the couple in which one person is a high rate taxpayer and 
the other has little or no income both tend to benefit in terms of taxes saved when 
treated as a couple. It is also important to note that one cannot choose to be or not 
be a common law partner. If a person meets the statutory test of common law part-
ner, that status is ascribed to that person and all the rules that apply to common 
law relationships apply to him or her. Thus it is vital that the rules that take spousal 
status into account operate in a fair and efficient manner. 
In this paper I focus on two distinct aspects of these recent developments. 
First, I contend that the government’s decision not to appeal Rosenberg, and its will-
ingness to include same-sex couples as common law partners for tax purposes, was 
a pragmatic political decision, a decision that was not based on any analysis of the 
change from a tax policy perspective. As I shall discuss in more detail, such a change 
resulted in a tax windfall for the federal government in terms of the amount of tax 
collected. A large proportion of the windfall was due to a reduction in the amount 
of tax credits available to common law partners, a reduction that resulted from the 
aggregation of income when determining entitlement to those credits. At the same 
time, including same-sex couples as common law partners accords perfectly with 
the neo-liberal agenda of privatization of the economic security of citizens. This 
11. The author spoke with several groups of lesbian and gay individuals about the impact on 
them of the changes to the definition of spouse and generally speaking most of those individuals 
believed they would benefit from the change even though in fact many of them would pay more tax 
as a result of the change.
12. Young, supra note 3.
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neo-liberal agenda uses the tax system to encourage individual family members to 
care for each other, thereby relieving the state of its responsibility. 
The Politics of It All
Tax Windfall
Income tax law is one of the most important political tools that a government has as 
its disposal. Tax laws are used to direct economic and social behavior in a myriad of 
different ways. Many of the most important measures we use to achieve social poli-
cy goals are tax expenditures. As mentioned above, inclusion of same-sex couples as 
common law partners for tax purposes resulted in a tax windfall for the government 
because some individuals lost entitlement to certain tax expenditures and thus were 
required to pay more taxes when treated as part of a couple than they previously 
paid as individuals. While the federal government has not published the amount 
of this windfall, it has been estimated to be approximately $130 million. The pri-
mary reason for the increased tax revenues is attributable to the rules that require 
the combining of spouses’ and common law partners’ incomes for the purpose of 
computing entitlement to the refundable GST tax credit and the Canada Child 
Tax Benefit. Entitlement to both these tax credits depends on one’s level of income 
and, as income increases, the amount of the credit is reduced and eventually phased 
out completely. Therefore, for example, two individuals with incomes of $20,000 
who are now included as common law partners will lose entitlement to either all or 
part of these refundable tax credits. The impact of this change is especially harsh on 
those with low incomes, the very group the tax credits are intended to benefit. There 
is also a gendered impact. Given that women tend to earn less than men and have 
lower incomes, it is likely that more women than men will lose these credits. 
The Privatization Agenda
One of the cornerstones of neo-liberalism and, more recently, neo-conservatism, 
is an increased reliance on the private sector, including the private family and the 
13. See, Kathleen Lahey, The Impact of Relationship Recognition on Lesbian Women in Canada: 
Still Separate and Only Somewhat “Equivalent” (Ottawa, 2001), vi.
14. In Canada, women who work full-year, full-time earn on average $41,331, whereas men 
who work full-year, full-time earn on average $58,537 (latest figures available). See, Statistics Canada, 
“Presence of Employment Income (10), Age Groups (5A) and Sex (3) for the Population 15 Years and 
Over of Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 
2005 – 20% Sample Data” (2005 Census statistics), http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/english/census06/
data/topics/RetrieveProductTable.cfm?.
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private market, rather than the state, to provide for the welfare of citizens. As Lisa 
Philipps has said, “the drive towards privatization in Canada has at its heart one 
central claim: that private choice is better than public regulation as a mechanism for 
allocating resources and ordering social affairs.” In Canada, law, and in this con-
text, tax law, is being used increasingly as a tool of privatization. Tax expenditures 
in particular are often used as a private mechanism to achieve social or economic 
goals. While we see the state as “public” in contrast to the private market or family, 
by using tax expenditures delivered to the private sector to reinforce private respon-
sibilities the state is to a certain extent abdicating its public responsibility for that 
social or economic goal. 
In this chapter, I focus on just one aspect of that privatization: the trend to 
place responsibility on individual family members to care for each other, thereby re-
lieving the state of its responsibility in that regard. My contention is that by taking 
spousal and common law partner status into account with respect to entitlement 
to and allocation of a variety of tax expenditures, the tax system is one important 
tool in this privatization. For example, the Canadian government has made it clear 
that the future for Canadians in terms of their economic security in retirement is to 
contribute to private pension plans such as occupational pension plans (Registered 
Pensions Plans, RPP) and personal plans (Registered Retirement Pension Plans, 
RRSP), and not to rely on the more universal Old Age Security or the Canada 
Pension Plan. As a result, these private plans are heavily subsidized by tax expen-
ditures, including tax deductions for contributions to the plans, and a sheltering of 
all income earned by the plan from tax until either the contributions are withdrawn 
or the plan matures. The value of these tax expenditures is a staggering $38 billion 
for 2008, making tax expenditures for retirement savings the single largest tax ex-
penditure in Canada. 
15. Lisa Philipps, “Tax Law and Social Reproduction: The Gender of Fiscal Policy in an Age 
of Privatization” in Brenda Cossman and Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization, Law and the Challenge to 
Feminism (Toronto, 2002), 41.
16. For a detailed discussion of the role of law in the drive towards privatization see ibid., 
30–36.
17. The Old Age Security is a non-contributory plan consisting of a flat rate monthly sum 
paid to those over 65, although as income increases there is a clawback through the income tax system 
of part of the pension. Nevertheless it is the most “universal” pension plan in Canada. The Canada 
Pension Plan is a contributory income replacement plan and benefits are based on labour force par-
ticipation. Both these plans are described as “public” pensions in contrast to the private RPPs and 
RRSPs.
18. Canada, Department of Finance, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations, 2008 (Ottawa, 2008), 
Table 1.
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At a general level, the major problem for many is a lack of access to these 
plans. This is especially true for women whose lack of participation in the paid 
labour force in comparison to that of men means that many women are excluded 
from these plans. In Canada, women have consistently formed 70% of the part 
time labour force since the mid-1970s.0 Similarly, in order to access RRSPs, one 
must have the discretionary income to make the contribution. Given that women 
earn less than men, it is not surprising that more men than women make these 
contributions and thereby benefit from the tax expenditure. 
The government has recognized and attempted to remedy women’s unequal 
access to private pension plans and the accompanying tax subsidies to a certain ex-
tent. Consequently, the ITA permits contributions to a “spousal” RRSP. A taxpayer 
may contribute to a plan in their spouse or common law partner’s name and receive 
the same tax benefits that they would have received had they made the contribution 
to their own plan. Thus there is the opportunity to establish a pension plan for one’s 
spouse or common law partner and to split income with that person by diverting 
future income to him or her. The advantages can be significant in situations where 
the spouse or common law partner has little or no other income when they retire. 
While the Canadian “spousal” RRSP is a well-intentioned measure, it re-
mains a highly private and limited response to the public issue of women’s lack of 
access to pension and superannuation plans. This lack of access contributes to the 
fact that so many elderly women live in poverty. Essentially, the private family is 
encouraged to provide for its own economic security in retirement, albeit with a tax 
break to encourage them to do so. But many cannot take advantage of this oppor-
tunity. Low income taxpayers may not have the discretionary funds to contribute 
on their spouse’s behalf. Additionally, single women have no access to this expendi-
ture. Given that 43% of single women over 65 live below the poverty line compared 
to 5% of women over 65 who have a spouse, it appears that the subsidy is being 
misdirected. By linking this tax expenditure to spousal status, the government is 
directing the benefit to a very limited group of people, a group that may not be the 
19. In 2006 only 58% of women over 15 are employed in Canada, compared to 68% of men 
(latest figures available), see Marcia Almey, Family and Social Statistics Division, Statistics Canada, 
Women in Canada: Work Chapter Updates (Ottawa, 2006), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89f0133x/
89f0133x2006000-eng.htm#2
20. Ibid. 
21. Supra note 14.
22. In Canada in 2000, 72% of those over 65 living below the poverty line were wom-
en; see Statistics Canada, Income in Canada, 2006 (Ottawa, 2008), http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.
gc.ca/collection_2008/statcan/75-202-X/75-202-XIE2006000
23. Ibid.
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neediest. Furthermore, in Canada at least, statistics show that fewer people than 
ever are living in a married or common law relationship. As the Women and Taxa-
tion Working Group of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission stated, “the concept of 
a couple as a life-long economic unit with joint income, wealth, and expenses may 
no longer be appropriate given changing family structures, increasing divorce rates, 
and falling marriage rates.”
As I have demonstrated, reliance on the private sector for the economic secu-
rity of individuals is problematic for a variety of reasons. At a general level such priva-
tization policies tend to diminish the role that the state plays in ensuring a fair level 
of income for all its citizens. The state is delegating its responsibility to the private 
sector with virtually no strings attached. Encouraging the private family to fill the 
role previously taken by the state leaves gaps in the social security network, gaps that 
people without spouses or common law partners often fall through. As discussed 
in the pension context, the result is often a retirement lived in poverty. The current 
privileging of private pension plans also reduces the resources available for the more 
universal state pensions, pensions on which women in particular depend for their 
economic security in retirement. Applying tax expenditure analysis to these provi-
sions, one can conclude that they are not the best way to achieve the policy goal of 
ensuring that Canadians, and women in particular, are economically secure in their 
retirement. As I have discussed, they are too limited in scope and benefit some at the 
expense of others with no rational justification for that discrimination. 
Other Tax Expenditures
I now turn to some of the other tax expenditures that take spousal status into 
account.
The Dependent Spouse and Common Law Partner Credit 
The spousal and common law partner tax credit is available to a taxpayer who sup-
ports his or her spouse. Put simply, the taxpayer is entitled to a tax credit of just 
24. Statistics Canada, “2006 Census: Families, marital status, households and dwelling char-
acteristics,” The Daily (Ottawa, September 12, 2007).
25. Ontario Fair Tax Commission, Women and Tax Working Group, Women and Taxation 
(Toronto, 1992), 22.
26. During the past twenty years, 99% of the income gain of the 10% of elderly women living 
alone with the lowest incomes was from higher direct government payments. For the 20% of women 
in the middle of the income distribution, direct government transfers accounted for more than 80% 
of their gain, see Statistics Canada, Analysing Family Income, (last modified March 3, 2004). http://
www.12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/analytic/companion/inc/canada.cfm#14.
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over $1,000, which is reduced in amount if the spouse or common law partner’s 
income exceeds approximately $680, and with the credit eliminated once the spouse 
or common law partner’s income exceeds approximately $7,000. As the Law Com-
mission of Canada has said, “the credit appears to be designed to promote economic 
dependency in conjugal relationships.”
There have been many critiques of the spousal and common law partner tax 
credit. First, because more women than men work in the home and not in the 
paid labour force, it is men who predominantly claim the spousal and common law 
partner tax credit. Several issues arise when one considers the impact on women 
of provisions such as the spouse and common law partner tax credit. Provisions 
based on dependency are a disincentive to women’s participation in the paid labour 
force. When the tax costs such as the loss of the credit are taken into account, there 
is a real disincentive to women in spousal or common law relationships entering 
the paid labour force. This disincentive is exacerbated by other costs incurred by 
women who choose to work outside the home, such as childcare costs, travel costs, 
clothing, and the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with replacing the 
household labour. Furthermore, when one considers that many women are the sec-
ondary earners in their relationships, and that they work for relatively low wages, 
the combination of these factors and the loss of the tax credit have a particularly 
detrimental effect on women’s choice to work outside the home. They create an 
unacceptable penalty.
Another important critique of dependency provisions is that rules like the 
spousal and common law partner tax credit affirm that a woman’s dependency on 
a man deserves tax relief. Again, this undermines the autonomy of women and it 
results in a certain privatization of economic responsibility for dependent persons. 
Tax policy has responded to women’s lack of economic power by leaving it to the 
family (the private sector) to assume responsibility for women’s lack of resources. 
Furthermore, the tax subsidy is delivered to the economically dominant person 
in the relationship and not the “dependent” person who needs it. This manner of 
delivery assumes that income is pooled and wealth distributed equally within the 
relationship. However, research has shown that such pooling is not the norm in re-
lationships, with one study demonstrating that it only occurs in one fifth of house-
27. Law Commission of Canada, supra note 9, 74.
28. See, e.g., Law Commission of Canada, ibid., 77, which recommended that the spousal tax 
credit be repealed and replaced with “enhanced or new programs that more carefully target caregiv-
ers and children.”
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holds surveyed. Many women do not have access to or control over income earned 
by their spouse; predicating tax policies on the assumption that they do is unfair.
The spousal and common law partner tax credit is a measure that can be viewed 
as one that gives public recognition to the work done by women in the home. It is 
the only measure (tax or otherwise) that places a “value” on household labour. But 
if it is intended to recognise the contribution made by those who work in the home 
then, as mentioned above, the tax credit should go to the person who performs that 
labour and not the person who benefits from it. Further, viewing the tax credit as a 
measure that values household labour is problematic because the “value” placed on 
the labour is so low. The measure can only be considered to reinforce the perception 
that household labour, including childcare, has little value. That in turn contributes 
to the under-valuation of work such as childcare, even when it is performed in the 
open market, as evidenced by the low salaries paid to childcare workers.
Another justification for the spousal or common law partner tax credit is that 
it recognizes that individuals who support their economically dependent spouse or 
common law partner have a reduced ability to pay tax. This argument is not per-
suasive. It ignores the benefit that accrues to the individual from work performed in 
the home, such as housework and childcare, by the person whom they support. In-
deed, this home labour may well increase the employed partner’s ability to support 
the non-employed partner because there is no need to have recourse to the private 
market in order to obtain the services provided in the home by the non-employed 
spouse. This point was not lost on the Royal Commission on the Status of Women 
in 1970 when it rejected the Carter Commission recommendation that the family be 
the unit of taxation. At that time the Royal Commission on the Status of Women 
noted that “in most cases the wife who works at home as a housekeeper, far from be-
ing a dependent, performs essential services worth at least as much to her as to her 
husband as the cost of food, shelter and clothing that he provides for her.”0 Given 
all these problems it is not surprising that various individuals and organizations 
have called for the repeal of the spousal or common law tax credit.
29. Carolyn Vogler and Jan Pahl, “Money, Power and Inequality within Marriage,” Sociologi-
cal Review 42 (1994), 285.
30. Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, Report (Ottawa, 1970), 
293–294.
31. See, e.g., Law Commission of Canada, supra note 9, 77; Maureen Maloney, “What is 
the Appropriate Tax Unit for the 1990s and Beyond?,” in Allan Maslove, ed., Issues in the Taxation 
of Individuals (Toronto, 1994), 146; and Claire Young, What’s Sex Got To Do With It?: Tax and the 
Family (Ottawa, 2000), 113.
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The Tax-Free Transfer of Capital Property to a Spouse
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the impact of the rules that take spousal or com-
mon law status into account varies depending on the level of income of the spouses 
or common law partners and the distribution of income within the relationship. 
There is no question that those couples with high incomes and significant wealth 
can benefit tremendously from some of the tax rules. One example is the ability to 
transfer capital property to your spouse or common law partner on a tax-free basis, 
either inter vivos or on death. Canada’s tax treatment of capital differs from that of 
most other jurisdictions. There are no estate taxes, succession duties, or gift taxes in 
Canada. Rather, when capital property is transferred from one person to another, 
either by way of a gift or bequest, the general rule is that the transferor is deemed 
to have disposed of the property at fair market value. The result is that if the fair 
market value of the property at the time of transfer is more than the cost of the 
property to the transferor, a capital gain arises and one half of the gain is included in 
the transferor’s income. A significant exception to this rule exists. If the transfer is 
to a spouse or common law partner, a rollover of the property occurs. The taxpayer 
is deemed to dispose of the property for proceeds of disposition equal to their cost 
for the property and the spouse or common law partner acquiring the property at 
an amount equal to those proceeds of disposition. The result is a significant deferral 
of tax until the spouse or common law partner ultimately disposes of the property. 
The rollover is available both on an inter vivos basis and on death and is also avail-
able with respect to a transfer to a former spouse or former common law partner in 
settlement of rights arising from the marriage or common law partnership.
These rules serve a variety of purposes. From a practical perspective, if trans-
fers between spouses were taxable events, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) 
would have to trace all such transactions in order to ensure that any tax owing was 
paid. Given the informal context in which these transactions occur, such a task 
would be difficult. Another problem is that because these transactions do not take 
place in the open market, there may be a liquidity problem with no cash available 
to pay the tax. The rollover rules are also intended to encourage the redistribution 
of property within the relationship, especially from men, who tend to own more 
capital property than women, to their spouse or common law partner. It is ques-
tionable, however, how effective they are in this regard. There are many reasons why 
an individual may choose not to transfer property to their spouse on an inter vivos 
32. Section 69 of the ITA.
33. Section 70(6) of the ITA provides the rollover for transfers as a consequence of death to 
a spouse or common law partner or to a spouse trust and section 73(1) and (1.01) of the ITA provides 
the rollover for inter vivos transfers to a spouse or common law partner.
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basis, including concern about transferring control of that property to the spouse or 
common law partner. These rules are also affected by the operation of the attribu-
tion rules. If capital property that is transferred to a spouse or common law partner 
at less than fair market value generates income, that income is attributed to the 
transferor and not taxed to the spouse or common law partner, thereby preventing 
income splitting with respect to income from property. Given that most of these 
transfers are presumably gifts, the attribution of income may well operate to deter 
taxpayers from entering these transactions. It is impossible to determine whether 
the rollover rules do encourage the redistribution of wealth on an inter vivos basis in 
spousal and common law relationships. While the CRA classifies these provisions 
as tax expenditures, they do not put a value on the expenditures because the data is 
not available to support a meaningful estimate or projection.
These rules can be critiqued on a variety of bases. First, they only benefit those 
couples with considerable wealth who own capital property. In the absence of gift 
taxes or estate taxes, these rules provide a huge benefit to those couples because 
there is no taxation of any appreciation in the value of the capital property owned by 
the couple so long as it is owned by either of the spouses or common law partners. 
Secondly, while it may be difficult to trace intra-spousal inter vivos transfers, the 
same cannot be said of transfers on death where the will or other documents relat-
ing to probate or intestacy will provide information about the transfer.
The rollover rules are predicated on an assumption of economic interdepen-
dence and economic mutuality, that is, what is mine is yours and what is yours is 
mine. Yet not all spousal and common law relationships are founded on economic 
interdependence, nor is there an economic mutuality within the relationship with 
respect to property. Thus the rollover rules can be said to be over-inclusive. They 
are rules that apply in situations that do not reflect their underlying policy. This 
problem led the Law Commission of Canada to recommend the extension of the 
rules to all persons living in economically interdependent relationships. I disagree 
with their recommendation and believe that the inter vivos rules at least should be 
repealed outright. First, as mentioned above, the application of the attribution rules 
34. Section 74.1 of the ITA.
35. Section 74.2 of the ITA also provides that a transfer of capital property to a spouse or 
common law partner must be at fair market value in order to avoid the attribution of any capital gain 
arising from that transfer to the transferor when the spouse or common law partner disposes of the 
property. 
36. Canada, Department of Finance, supra note 18.
37. The Law Commission of Canada described economic interdependence as the “raison 
d’etre of the rollover rules,” supra note 9, at 89.
38. Ibid., Recommendation 25.
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may deter taxpayers from entering into these transactions, thereby obviating the 
need for the rollover rules. Secondly, tracing problems are not unique to intra spou-
sal or common law partner transfers. Transfers to adult children or close friends 
can be equally difficult to trace. Furthermore, the ITA provides for a self-assess-
ing system in which taxpayers are required to declare a variety of transactions that 
cannot always be traced, including gifts to third parties. Finally, there is always the 
problem of defining “interdependence” if one goes down that road.
Provisions That Are Based on an Assumption of Economies of Scale in Relationships
Some of the provisions that apply to spousal and common law relationships take 
into account the economies of scale in terms of consumption and household pro-
duction that are assumed to arise from spouses and common law partners living 
together. These economies of scale arise from sharing the cost of certain items, such 
as rent and household expenses, including durable consumer assets such as furni-
ture and kitchen appliances, as well as the benefits from shared household work. 
The theory is that the savings from these shared expenses and labour increase a 
taxpayer’s ability to pay tax. 
Some provisions take into account the assumed increased ability to pay that 
flows from economies of scale by aggregating the incomes of spouses and common 
law partners for the purposes of determining entitlement to tax credits. For ex-
ample, the child tax credit is aimed at low income individuals and is intended to give 
them some financial support with respect to the costs of raising children. Because 
it is targeted at low income individuals, the tax credit is phased out by 5% of the 
individual’s income over approximately $30,000. However, the income of spouses 
and common law partners is aggregated for the computing of entitlement to the 
Child tax credit, with the result that the amount they receive as a couple will be less 
than they received as two individuals. 
The issue of aggregating the income of families or spouses when determining 
entitlement to tax credits is complex. To the extent that is based on an assump-
tion of economies of scale, it is highly problematic. First, economies of scale arise 
in a variety of situations other than spousal or common law relationships. As the 
Law Commission of Canada noted, “even if consumption economies exist when 
individuals live together and share resources, and even if one takes the view that 
they should be taken into account in government transfers, conjugal cohabitation 
has become an increasingly poor proxy for the identification of such economies.” 
Many other individuals, such as students or good friends share accommodation and 
the associated expenses. The tax system takes no account of their economies of scale 
39. Ibid., 80.
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when determining entitlement to tax credits. In addition, individuals enter into all 
kinds of arrangements that produce economies of scale, such as car pooling, sharing 
a baby sitter for their children, recycling consumer durables by passing them on to 
a friend when new purchases are made. Again the tax system takes no account of 
these transactions. Given that it is virtually impossible to identify when household 
economies arise or to define the nature of the relationships in which they do arise, 
tax provisions should not be based on an assumption that such economies exist 
and enhance the ability to pay of spouses and common law partners.0 I agree with 
the Law Commission of Canada which concluded that “income security programs 
should not assume that the benefits of individual income are always shared with 
others in conjugal relationships and that sharing never occurs in other relation-
ships,” and share their view that entitlement to tax credits such as the child tax 
credit should be determined by reference to individual income and not spousal or 
family income.
It is interesting to note how arguments based on economies of scale are used 
(or not used). The example of the child tax credit indicates that those with relatively 
low and equal incomes lose a tax benefit because of assumed economies of scale. 
One does not, however, hear much talk of the advantages of economies of scale 
when looking at the tax treatment of the couple with one high income earner and 
a spouse or common law partner with little or no income. A recent development in 
Canada demonstrates this inconsistency in policy.
In 2007 the federal government introduced rules that permit the splitting of 
pension income between spouses or common law partners. Income splitting ben-
efits the couple in which one partner has a high income and the other no income. 
The reason is that income that would be taxed at a high marginal rate of tax is taxed 
at a much lower rate because it is effectively taxed in the hands of the partner who 
had no income. Income splitting generates a huge tax saving for the couple, a sav-
ings of approximately $8,000 for the couple in which one partner has an income of 
over $120,000 and the other partner has no income. But of course the couple with 
relatively equal incomes (regardless of how high or low they are) will save nothing. I 
suggest that there are problems with the new rules. First, the income split is purely 
fictional; there is no requirement that the money ever be transferred to the low 
income spouse, usually the woman. Given that we tend to tax people on what they 
control, such a measure flies in the face of that principle. Secondly, the low income 
spouse’s marginal tax rate has increased from nil to a higher rate and she is liable to 
40. Ibid., 82.
41. Ibid., 87.
42. See http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg/ITA-l_ftt1206e.html.
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pay that tax, even though she has not received any funds and may not receive any 
benefit. The assumption appears to be that there is an economic mutuality in the 
relationship but that is not always the case and there is nothing to stop the high rate 
taxpayer from putting the tax savings into his own pocket.
Conclusion
In this paper I have demonstrated that it is high time that we reconsider taking 
spousal relationships into account for tax purposes. Some rules are simply inequi-
table and discriminate without good reason against those with low incomes and in 
favour of those with high incomes. Others, such as those based on dependency, are 
inherently flawed and poorly targeted so that they do not achieve their policy goals. 
Some rules can be critiqued because they are based on outmoded and incorrect as-
sumptions including, for example, the assumption that there is a pooling of income 
in many relationships. At the end of the day I suggest that it is women, often by 
reason of their lower incomes, who pay a significant penalty when treated as spouses 
or common law partners for tax purposes.
